

~~37039~~  
72  
MOKA-11643

2011

5/5/81  
Chief, Foreign Branch "M"  
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
Operational  
KIBITZ Progress Report Summary

24 October 1949

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
CLASSIFICATION	
Sanctioned	<u>Secret</u>
Changed to	
BY AU HORITY DE -	
Name	<u>EET/9</u>
Office	
Date	<u>20 JAN 1956</u>
FSC	

1. Subject operation, activated as a medium for recruiting, training, and controlling stay-behind agents with special emphasis on secret radio communications, is gradually assuming a recognizable shape. As a result of plans and effort, trial and error successes and failures, it has oftentimes shown symptoms of a Tepay-like growth. However, we hope that we have grown with it.

2. During the exploratory stages in this new field of operation we could only presume a program of exploitation. With the obvious primary specification of stayability tempered by availability, we explored the potential in special fields of employment, the physically handicapped and the aged. And as a special qualification, attempts were made to restrict candidacy to Germans of political neutrality, or at least with no compromising history of employment or close association with the occupation forces. It is this latter qualification which has presented the greatest hindrance to progress and for which we have had to compromise our previously conceived notion of lone agents operating independently. The most outstanding example of the futility and frustration in recruiting in this qualification category was in our elementary effort to make direct contact with prospective Germans independent of intermediary references or introductions. For this we advertised in the newspapers stating the case of an American who would like to make social acquaintances with Germans so he could improve his German conversational abilities. This advertisement produced some fifty applicants who were subsequently screened against our recruitment standards. While many of the applicants could be evaluated in initial interviews, the family or social group of favorably qualified dandicates required like consideration. The thus compounding commitments for return visits for further evaluations were almost overwhelming. Nonetheless, the prospect of this vista of recruit potential faded discouragingly as closer acquaintanceship revealed unfavorable characteristics or influences. Whereas in our first estimates of production for this effort we could only hope to apply the civilian

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

Distr: (2)(A) Privacy   
FBM 2 w/2 att. (2)(B) Methods/Sources   
GOS 1 8/1 att. (2)(G) Foreign Relations   
KOB 1 w/2 att.  
Commo 1 w/1 att.

GKTS: 5-93

COPY No. 2

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

salesman's standards of 15 calls: 5 favorable interviews and 1 sale, we soon learned the essence of KIBITZ recruitment could not be reduced to a sign on the dotted line contract closure. Instead, contrary to our optimism, our present estimation of the ration of contacts to commitments is 50-1. Obviously this type of pussy-fooding is too inefficient in the fact of the urgent need for stay-behind agents. On the other hand, contrary to the club car witticism of the favorable replies to the direct yes or no approach, the security of the overall operation forbids bare faced propositioning.

3. Further, the experience obtained in the chore of burying the VULTURE sets allocated to KOB showed other reasons for need of compromise in our original conception of the lone agent. The normal measures of security exercised in the burying of the sets will necessarily be manifold in the time of recovery. The mental picture of one lone agent going out into the night in a land of a well policed aggressor military occupation is beyond conception. The first slam of the pick and the grate of the shovel can be a morale shattering clatter unless bolstered by accomplice lookouts guarding the avenues of apprehension. Inasmuch as the agent will thus have need for accomplices, and probably again later assistance in maintaining security and intelligence coverage during operation, we are presented with a wider scope of recruitment. And, whereas in some cases, the basic recruit may be capable of selecting his own accomplices, other cases will require our making the selections to guarantee a competent operating unit consisting of cover patronage and intelligence procurement as well as a sender. While at first glance this might appear to add to the burden of recruitment, it also offers redemptions in the lessening of the stringencies of finding all qualifications in one man.

4. As a further deterrent to individual recruitment, we have found that the necessary continued liaison presents a risk to the most guiltless German. The need for working through cutouts is therefore compelling, and subsequently, a qualified cutout will also be adaptable as a recruiting agent. This compromise to our pre-conceived modus operandi might appear to expose us to the forfeits of chain operations. However, the accompanying map which portrays the disposition of KOB's KIBITZ coverage shows representation in three phases: lone operators, single cells, and connected units. We will continue our efforts toward setting up lone agents, but we can obviously expect most progress in the development of connected units. And even here, it will be noted that the hook-up is more in the form of a rimless wheel than a chain, and, time permitting the elimination of the central link, the net can be broken up into separate operating units.

5. The attached map is self explanatory with regard to the geographical coverage so far achieved in KOB's recruitment. The varied colored lines are employed only for clarity of portrayal and in no way are intended as a code for evaluation. As for the individual agents, they will be taken up in categorical fields of priority:

A. Physically Handicapped: As stated in a previous memo regarding this group, we have had to judge many of the prospects psychologically or temperamentally unadaptable to VULTURE work. A more or less concentrated study was available through Plaine's exploitation of the Stuttgart Social Amt where, under cover arranged with Signal Corps, he presented himself as a pre-war social worker who

still retains a sympathy for the handicapped and is now using his position with the occupation forces to prevail upon the Signal Corps to give rehabilitatory employment to the German war-wounded. Our observations here, substantiated by others who have made similar considerations, were that most of the war-wounded, from either front, have a belly full of war and are taking solace in their wounds which will excuse them from further conflict. And in some cases, there is strong evidence of the world-owes-me-a-living attitude. Less specifically, it must be recognized that development among the handicapped calls for psychological and social case work which an intelligence case worker is not equipped to provide. However, the emphasis given this priority group is reflected in the present ratio of four such handicapped among KOB's coverage.

1. KIBITZ 3 (MGKA-11345): As an unsophisticated youth of 21, his mild manners belie a creditable tenacity of purpose. Suffering a paralytic atrophy of left arm and leg which had pretty much confined him to the family's sixth floor apartment, he proceeded on a course of self study among which was English, which he perfected with months of repeating the words of the AFN radio announcer. This ability to learn coupled with his code aptitude test score of 109 makes him one of the most promising sender prospects. It would be no surprise to find he will have taught himself the Morse code before we can arrange the training for him.

Further, his response to the pro-American indoctrination is almost embarrassing. Recruitment was under Signal Corps cover as security against the family. Control and training will also be under the same cover until his training has progressed to the degree where further orientation is necessary.

For actual operations, it is recommended that he be restricted to the technical aspects under a trained intelligence operator where his mild mannerisms will be a security asset.

2. KIBITZ 5 (MGKA-11557): Qualifications as physically handicapped due to his war plane crash head injuries from which he now has a partial steel skull become almost secondary to the man's other qualifications of character and his air force communications experience. As the 29 year old son of a dentist of comfortable means, his program for a professional education was sacrificed by the war. He now is attempting to provide for his family without financial assistance from his father.

Subject was recommended by KIBITZ #2 and was partially worked through him. However, Subject's impending household move out of #2's orbit presents an opportunity to work him directly in which case we will have full benefit of his self sufficiency.

3. KIBITZ #11 (MGKA-11582): Classification in the physically handicapped category is by virtue of his 50% incapacities suffered from four war wounds and one freezing. However, Subject is well qualified otherwise, having proven himself in war service (Iron Cross, 1st & 2nd class) and through eighteen years of acquaintance with C. St.

SECRET

Of all of       's retirees, (MOKA-9764) KIBITZ #11 is the only one who knows of       's activity and then is still led to believe that       's efforts were strictly of pro-German motivation in seeking US help for Germany against Communism, of which motive KIBITZ #11 wholly approves. He is the one who opened        to       , and, after transferring to the West Zone, pointed        to his replacement in       , who produced well for the duration of that operation.

For his present recruitment, he has been informed that the operation is of German initiative with US support and that        (as a friend) is contacting him for plans in the event of emergencies, such as an unprecedented Communist victory in a Western election, or a Communistic military aggression. His duties as outlined consist of: information gathering, safe haven (for which his little home on the outskirts of the village would be ideal), and assistance in building up a communication unit.

He enters the commitment without reservation and will take the radio training as necessary, but joins many of the recruits in suggesting we also consider women for W/T training because they would be more readily available for the training and offer greater stayability.

4. KIBITZ #7 (      ): Subject is well known as one of our long term stay-behind agents. While he has been fully cultivated and indoctrinated, the specific briefing and training for his mission are still being held in abeyance until disposition of the former cutout who at the moment is a questionable factor.

As a matter of record, it should be stated that though Subject measures up to all our standards of recruitment, even to the priority group of the handicapped, it is       's judgment that Subject cannot be expected to work independently as a lone operator. He will probably require accomplices of a stronger heart to forward his mission in secret radio communications. However, the present moment does not require the designation of his supervisor and he will continue to be handled directly and trained as a lone agent.

B. Qualification by Age: Early categorical speculations emphasized the potential stayability of men in the upper age bracket. The proof of this theory must remain until an aggressor occupation force establishes its criteria for age deferments from dislocating conscriptions. Further, present estimates by Commo personnel are that candidates in the upper age brackets might not be adaptable to the gruelling communications training.

However, their possible usefulness is not to be discounted entirely. An innocent old man might prove just the type to provide cover for communications operations. We ourselves as strangers in a strange land have little occasion to develop associations among the elders. However,       , in his brief to develop the Baltic coverage went to his old sea dog patrons for counsel and came up with an intelligence coverage that is so productive that we can not hold it in reserve for KIBITZ operations. But for the specifics of this report, the following candidate at age 49 comes closest to qualifying for this category:

KIBITZ #8 (MOKA-11587): At one time vice president of the Leipzig ODU,

       3000

-5-

he was briefly a victim of MVD manipulations. On the day of a scheduled meeting, the ODU president was detained by the MVD. Shortly before meeting time, KIBITZ 8, as vice president, was informed that the permit for the meeting had been revoked. As an only course of action, he proceeded to the meeting place to call off the meeting and while still in the process of disbanding the group, was arrested for unauthorized assembly. Shortly thereafter, he and the president were freed under the condition that they would submit reports on ODU activities. They both promptly fled the zone as apparently was desired by the MVD, thus leaving their ODU positions vacant for more selective candidates. At least their flight appears to have been desired by the MVD inasmuch as 8's family was not once questioned regarding his whereabouts during the several months they remained in Leipzig while waiting for him to become established in the West Zone.

His orientation of the KIBITZ operation is similar to that of most others; a German initiative with US sponsorship. He accepts the required commitments without reservation other than insisting on full assurance that he will not be required to act, nor be misled into acting, against the allies. However, there might be a question of his stayability due to the MVD experience, but from the MVD's lack of followthrough, we are almost convinced that 8's temporary arrest was nothing more than a local political maneuver.

C. Special Employment: In early thinking of special employments as qualifications for KIBITZ candidacy, we were mindful of the stayability of low level employees in essential municipal, state, and federal services. While it is common knowledge that many in this employment group have responded to ideologies opposite to ours, we must admit we have so far failed to kindle a kindred idealism. Rather, from the frequency with which they made their social calls at meal times it would appear they look upon an American association as a promotion from their present small time patronage. This became nauseatingly obvious when one policeman was bold enough to suggest that if I had any gifts in mind for him it might be more convenient for me to make them in scrip - he could make his own purchases at the PX!

There have been other suggestions of recruiting among the foresters and game wardens. Not being much inclined toward hunting and fishing, we have taken only one occasion to survey the area, but do admit the possibilities there. And though willing as one might be to further explore this field, present commitments almost prohibit such time consuming excursions.

However, and still within the category of special employment, but not in the sense of stayability, we have come to the point of compromising with our pre-conceived reluctance to work the field of radio operators. The logic of our first veto still stands - a known radio operator is suspect *per se*, and the registry of his proficiency is a handy reference for a wholesale round-up. Yet, despite all the arguments against them, it is becoming more and more obvious that we will have to take the risk in order to have immediate assurance of available senders. At the moment, the result of inestimable effort shows us with eleven solid recruits but with not one who could be fielded without extensive training. We therefore must ask for reconciliation with our established ban on radio hams in the hope that those recruited will be able to

survive long enough under cover to justify the risk.

Here, however, though there are innumerable available rosters of past and present radio operators, we encounter the same old bogey of lack of common ground on which to work for evaluation screenings. As a partial solution (MOKA-10814) we have programmed [ ] to take the necessary training and examinations in order to set himself up as a ham in his own right and thus earn entre to the elite ham fraternity through which we can make contacts. Also afoot is a program of recruitment among [ ] former Wehrmacht intercept service men. Whereas [ ] himself is disqualified as having been an active agent in our employ, nor is he personally interested in this project inasmuch as he feels he will be more valuable to us in intercept from outside of the enemy zone, he has so far submitted two candidates. One a code expert (Gottingen, British Zone) who is not yet ready for inclusion in this report, and the other a former funker now living in Ober Bavaria:

KIBITZ #10 (MOKA-11585): Qualification for the category of Special Employment are met by Subject's military experience in radio communications. Trained for radio work from induction in 1939, his first duties were as observation post radio man for a radio direction finder unit. Subsequent experience was as intercept operator, and in a later period as acting chief of a signal network (radio and telegraph) of 13 radio teams with responsibilities of call signals, frequency and code assignment, and maintenance of radio equipment. Later, with further training for an evaluation post, he served as evaluator in HQ Signal Detachment, Army Group South.

In addition to having ready made qualifications for VULTURE operations, we can expect technical advice in setting up VULTURE units.

Subject is one of [ ] former colleagues, and for security reasons will continue to be handled through [ ] until we receive approval for aptitude tests and training. We hope to utilize his present interim of self employment for his training period.

D. General:

1. KIBITZ #2 (MOKA-11163): The referenced memorandum requesting authority for his training fully outlines the history of his recruitment.

Originally cultivated under our presumption of lone agent, he was painstakingly developed and accredited as such (aptitude score 120).

Later, as experience began to teach us the fallacies in the lone agent theory, he simultaneously underwent the transition to the self contained operating unit. However, as we became acquainted with his operational accomplices, we judged them as too valuable to be subordinated to his unit and now have taken measures to cut them (#5 & #6) out and set them up separately. However, he still retains #4 within his unit, and is now preparing personalia on others of his selection, one of whom is an amputee (left leg at thigh) whom we will be very anxious to assimilate into the program.

2. KIBITZ #4 (MOKA-11344): Recruited as a teammate for #2, Subject measures up to his local reputation as a solid citizen whose maturity and military experience as a captain in the mountain troops will be a decided asset to #2 in his VULTURE operation. For reasons of security, his recruitment is being handled in two phases. In one, he is in full complicity with #2 in a sense of responsibility to Germany in case of Soviet occupation, and in the other, for purposes of training, he is being handled by        under Signal Corps cover. He has passed his aptitude test (score 92) for possible Signal Corps employment. We will continue to handle him in this manner until it is determined whether his training is to go beyond the technical aspects of transmissions, leaving the codings to #2, or whether he is to get the full orientation.

3. KIBITZ #9 (MOKA-11586): As the personalia in the referenced memo will indicate, Subject is well prepared for a profession in engineering and his respect for American engineering principles and developments stands third (1. anti-Communism; 2. pro-Germanism) in the scale of his motivations for entering KIBITZ operations.

Recommended and presently handled by        until approved for training, his orientation is still restricted to the cover of KIBITZ being an operation of German initiative with US support. His recent promotion from the less critically conspicuous position of janitor at the time of recruitment to that of manager of the Schwabmunchen Amerika Haus was an unforeseen development which leaves much to be desired. However, with the present dire need of recruits, we can ill afford to scrap him. Rather, we hold with his hopes for employment in engineering in some other part of Germany after which we can further evaluate time's clouding over of his association with the US occupation.

4. KIBITZ #6 (MOKA-11471): This recruit is evidence of the availability of ready-made candidates if only we had some expeditious means of soliciting them. As in this case, Subject's idealism, anti-Communism, pro-Germanism, pro-Americanism, combined with a quality of character that demanded he do something, made him an opportune find. A Panzer division buddy of #2, Subject was first to come to #2's mind when it appeared we would need help in digging out KIBITZ recruits. Although Subject's location in Tubingen was beyond #2's orbit, the strong recommendation justified an investigation of the possibility of using Subject to develop an operation in his area where we had little other hope of activity.

First contact was made by #2 to explore Subject's present attitude which was found to be much in line with our thinking. He, along with two comrades, had been giving serious thought to their responsibility and course of action should Germany be overrun by an aggressor force. They, however, had been thinking of employing their positions of leadership in the University (Subject was then president of the student union) for the formation of a resistance group. Upon this premise we took over the contact and turned Subject's thinking to our specific needs. Whereas resistance movements will develop spontaneously, there is a present need for men like him to prepare themselves for a more special mission. This

  80000

trend seems to afford Subject more tangible expression of his initiative, and he is now forming his program with a schedule for training after fall semester exams, and is making a personalia report for us on a former major adjutant of a general staff corps whom he would like to approach for recruitment as his intelligence observer.

The foregoing portrays only that portion of the KIBITZ program, admittedly the majority of same, handled by [ ] and gives you fairly completely the results of his activities in this field to date. A thumb-nail sketch of other KOB/KIBITZ activities follows:

The correspondence on KIBITZ #1 is up to date.

The [ ]/KIBITZ sub-project has still to bear fruit due to [ ]'s full time involvement in both [ ] and [ ] affairs.

Subject of MGKA-11568, a hunting contact of [ ], should be designated as KIBITZ #12. He will be used most likely as information gatherer and safe house. He fits admirably into both the over age and physically handicapped categories but is perhaps too rabidly anti-Communist for perfect stayability.

KOB has now concluded preliminary investigations of 3 Karlsruhe members of the DABO (through the [ ]) and another 3 have recently been assigned to them for investigation.

[ ]  
Chief, KOB

*[Signature]* SUBJECT

~~TOP SECRET~~

GKTS. 593

COPY No. att 2

Ref: MGKA-11643

LEGEND: (The colors employed in this map are for clarity of portrayal of KOB's KIBITZ coverage and are in no way intended as a code for evaluation.

(C) - 1: Since being relieved of his East Zone operations this agent of long standing is being utilized to recruit and act as cutout on KIBITZ operations (MGKA-9764). It should be noted that the agents shown as being worked through 2 do not know of each other.

(F) - 2 Though disqualified for having been an active agent, he is performing in a secondary role to open a ready field of KIBITZ operators among former German communications intercept service.

(1) - MGKA-9288

(2) - MGKA-11163: Recruited to be a lone agent with assistants added later to complete an operating unit. However, his #5 and #6 have developed to be of such self sufficiency that they are being cut off (indicated by broken line) to set up separate units. It should be noted that 4, 5, and 6 do not know each other.

(3) - MGKA-11345

(4) - MGKA-11344

(5) - MGKA-11557

(6) - MGKA-11471

(7) - MGKA-9436

(8) - MGKA-11587


(9) - MGKA-11586

(10) - MGKA-11585

(11) - MGKA-11582

XXX - Included to indicate direction of development but not yet qualified for this report.

~~TOP SECRET~~



agent operator

According

in

Australia

Now not out of picture

K-1 - money little but no attitude

This handicapped

3 youth 21 - paralysed atify

5 plot - steel plate

11 (E) - 4 was wounded 50% unable

safe house info gathered

youth  
village

(K7)

(undecided)

over 20 (K11) (undecided) (possibly)

Special employment

(Short term) K-10 ex - direct man

young

K-2

Recruiter

K-4

classmate + radio operator

(92) - little code of attitude - suggest  
shift to cutout and/or in cell training

K-9

E - Sub-munition America  
Habs. (hope to transplant elsewhere)

K-6

- Excellent Student Freeburg  
good for W.T.